

Audio file

[1973-10-25 - 26 - Henry Kissinger Press Conference on Middle East.mp3](#)

Transcript

00:00:02

In order that we might bring you the following NBC News Special report here from Washington is NBC News correspondent Douglas Kicker.

00:00:12

Good afternoon. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is about to hold a news conference to explain the reason why US armed forces have been placed on a general worldwide military alert.

00:00:24

The military alert was ordered last night by President Nixon after the Soviet Union reportedly notified this nation that it might send troops to the Middle East to police the ceasefire there. the US military alert was described by the White House today as precautionary and the Mideast War Front is reported to be generally quiet today, but President Nixon has canceled a news.

00:00:44

Conference scheduled for tonight to give full time to the situation. He'll hold it tomorrow instead. And Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev has canceled a speech in Moscow.

00:00:54

This morning, the President briefed congressional leaders on the situation, and now Secretary Kissinger will brief the American.

00:01:00

People.

00:01:01

Secretary Kissinger has just left the White House about 10 minutes ago, he conferred with the President again this morning for an hour and 45 minutes. Then Mr. Nixon walked him to his limousine, accompanied also by General Alexander Haig, the White House chief of staff. Mr. Kissinger then drove the short distance from the White House to the State Department. He has yet to appear.

00:01:21

In the auditorium but is expected momentarily. Other developments on this story, the UN Security Council has scheduled a meeting for this afternoon to deal with this crisis.

00:01:31

Mr. Kissinger met at great length last night with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, at that time. Reportedly, the United States was given a harsh note, warning that.

00:01:44

The.

00:01:44

The Soviet Union would unilaterally send troops to the Mid East if the United States did not go along with the plan whereby joint.

00:01:51

Troops US and Soviet troops would police the ceasefire there as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had requested?

00:01:59

This morning, the president met for 70 minutes with congressional leaders. He and Mr. Kissinger briefed them on the situation, and afterwards, House Speaker Carl Albert said that the emphasis is on diplomacy.

00:02:11

Mr. Nixon, we are told, was up until 3:00 AM this morning reporting our working on this situation afterwards.

00:02:18

A little sleep and then a long meeting again with the.

00:02:22

With Mr. Kissinger, we see Mr. Kissinger is now at the auditorium.

00:02:29

And we'll hopefully tell us what is going on.

00:02:39

The gentleman right now.

00:02:42

OK.

00:02:45

The White House announced this morning that the United States, and this is a quote the United States has no intentions of sending troops to the Mideast, and we hope no other outside parties will send troops to the Mideast.

00:02:48

Alright.

00:02:57

Ladies and gentlemen.

00:03:00

I saw the most useful introduction to your questions would be a summary of events between October six and today.

00:03:12

So that you can evaluate our actions situation in which we find ourselves and.

00:03:20

Our future course.

00:03:24

The crisis for us.

00:03:27

Started at 6:00 AM.

00:03:30

On October six.

00:03:32

When I was awakened with the information.

00:03:36

That a another Arab Israeli war.

00:03:41

Was proper.

00:03:44

I mentioned this personal detail because it answers the question that the United States intervention prevented Israel.

00:03:56

From taking preemptive act.

00:03:59

The United States made no demands to either side before October 6 because all the intelligence at our disposal.

00:04:09

And all the intelligence given to us by foreign countries.

00:04:13

Suggested that there was number possibility of the outbreak.

00:04:16

Of a war.

00:04:18

We had no reason to give any advice to any of the participants because we did not believe.

00:04:26

Nor may I say.

00:04:27

That the Israeli Government that an attack was imminent.

00:04:33

In the three hours between 6:00 AM and 9:00 AM.

00:04:37

We made major efforts to prevent the outbreak of the war.

00:04:44

By acting as an intermediary between the parties of assuring each of them.

00:04:50

That the other one were attempting to obtain the assurance of each side that the other one had no aggressive intent.

00:05:00

Before this process could be completed, however.

00:05:04

War had broken up.

00:05:06

And it started the process in which we are still engaged.

00:05:12

I do not think any useful purpose is served in reviewing every individual diplomatic move.

00:05:19

But I thought it would be useful to indicate some of the basic principles.

00:05:25

We attempted to follow.

00:05:28

Throughout the crisis, the President was convinced that we had two major problems. First.

00:05:39

To end hostile, it is as quickly as possible.

00:05:44

But secondly.

00:05:46

To end us till it is in a manner.

00:05:49

That would enable us to make a major contribution.

00:05:54

To removing the conditions that have produced 4 wars.

00:05:58

Between Arabs and Israelis.

00:06:01

In the last 25 years, we were aware.

00:06:08

That there were many interested parties.

00:06:13

There were, of course, the participants in the conflict.

00:06:17

Egypt and Syria on the Arab side, aided by many other Arab countries.

00:06:24

Israel on the other.

00:06:28

There was the Soviet Union.

00:06:32

There were the other permanent members of the Security Council and of course there was the United States.

00:06:40

It was our view.

00:06:42

That the United States could.

00:06:44

Be most effective?

00:06:47

In both the tasks outlined by the President.

00:06:51

That is of ending hostilities as well as of making a contribution.

00:06:57

To a permanent peace in the Middle East.

00:07:02

If we conducted ourselves so that we could remain.

00:07:06

In permanent contact.

00:07:09

With all of these elements in the equation.

00:07:14

Throughout the first week, we attempted to crystallize a consensus in the Security Council, which would bring about a ceasefire on terms that the world community could support.

00:07:31

We stated our basic principles on October 8th.

00:07:34

We did not submit them to a formal vote because we realized that no majority was available.

00:07:44

And we did not want sides to be chosen prematurely.

00:07:51

On October 10th.

00:07:53

The Soviet Union began an airlift.

00:07:57

Which began fairly moderately.

00:08:01

But which by October 12 had achieved fairly substantial levels.

00:08:11

Let me say a word here.

00:08:14

About our relationship with the Soviet Union throughout this crisis.

00:08:18

And what we have attempted to achieve.

00:08:23

The United States and the Soviet Union.

00:08:26

Are, of course, ideological.

00:08:29

And to some extent, political adversaries.

00:08:34

But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility.

00:08:41

We possess each of US nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity.

00:08:50

We both of us.

00:08:52

Have a special duty.

00:08:55

To see to it.

00:08:57

That confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life.

00:09:04

Both of us, sooner or later, we'll have to come to realize.

00:09:10

That the issues that divide the world today.

00:09:15

And foreseeable issues do not justify.

00:09:20

The unparalleled catastrophe.

00:09:23

That a nuclear war would represent, and therefore in all our dealings with the Soviet Union.

00:09:32

We have attempted to keep in mind.

00:09:36

And we have attempted to move them to a position.

00:09:42

In which this overriding interest that humanity shares with us.

00:09:49

Is never lost sight.

00:09:50

Of.

00:09:54

In a speech at Patcham.

00:09:58

In Terrace, I pointed out.

00:10:01

That there are limits.

00:10:02

Beyond which we cannot go.

00:10:05

I stayed.

00:10:07

That we will oppose the attempt.

00:10:10

By any country.

00:10:11

To achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally, that we would resist any attempt.

00:10:20

To exploit a policy of detente, to weaken our alliances.

00:10:26

And that we would react if their relaxations of tensions were used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

00:10:39

We have followed these principles.

00:10:42

In the current situation.

00:10:48

It is easy to start confrontations.

00:10:53

But in this age, we have to know.

00:10:56

Where we will be at the end and not only what poses the strike at the beginning.

00:11:05

Throughout the first week.

00:11:08

We attempted to bring about.

00:11:11

Moderation in the level of outside supplies that was introduced into the area.

00:11:19

And we attempted to work with the Soviet Union.

00:11:22

To on a ceasefire, resolute.

00:11:26

Which would bring an end to the conflict.

00:11:30

This first attempt failed.

00:11:32

On Saturday, October 13th.

00:11:36

For a variety of reasons, including perhaps.

00:11:42

A misspent.

00:11:44

Of the military situation.

00:11:46

By some of the participants.

00:11:50

We were then faced.

00:11:52

With the inability to produce a Security Council resolution that would command a consensus and the substantial introduction of arms by an outside power.

00:12:07

Into the area.

00:12:09

At this point.

00:12:12

On Saturday, October 13, the president decided.

00:12:17

That the United States would have to start a resupply effort of its own.

00:12:25

And the United States.

00:12:27

From that time on.

00:12:29

Has.

00:12:31

Engaged.

00:12:33

In maintaining the military balance in the Middle East.

00:12:39

In order to bring about.

00:12:41

The negotiated settlement that we had sought.

00:12:45

Concurrently with this.

00:12:48

We informed the Soviet Union.

00:12:51

That our interest in working out.

00:12:54

An acceptable.

00:12:56

Solution.

00:12:58

Still remained very strong.

00:13:03

And that is part of this solution. We were prepared to discuss a mutual limitation.

00:13:10

Of arm supply into the area.

00:13:15

In the days that followed.

00:13:18

The Soviet Union and we discussed various approaches.

00:13:23

To this question, the basic difficulty being how to reconcile the Arab insistence.

00:13:33

On an immediate commitment to a return to the 1967 borders with Israeli insistence.

00:13:40

On secure boundaries and they negotiated outcome.

00:13:46

As you all know.

00:13:48

On Topa 16.

00:13:52

Prime Minister Kosygin.

00:13:55

Went to Cairo.

00:13:57

To work on this problem.

00:14:01

With the leaders of Egypt.

00:14:06

He returned to the Soviet Union.

00:14:09

On October 19th.

00:14:14

We began exploring a new formula for ending the war that evening, though it was still unacceptable to us, and while we were still considering that formula.

00:14:28

Secretary General Brezhnev.

00:14:31

Send an urgent request to the President Nixon.

00:14:35

That I be sent to Moscow.

00:14:38

To conduct the negotiations.

00:14:42

In order to speed an end to hostilities.

00:14:45

That might be difficult to contain were they to continue.

00:14:53

The president agreed.

00:14:56

To Mr. Brezhnev's request, and as all of you know, I left for Moscow.

00:15:06

In the early morning of October 20th.

00:15:12

We spent two days of very intense negotiations.

00:15:20

And we developed a formula.

00:15:24

Which?

00:15:27

We believe.

00:15:29

Was acceptable to all of the parties.

00:15:33

And which we continue to believe represented a just solution to this tragic conflict.

00:15:42

The Security Council resolution had, as you all know, three parts.

00:15:49

It called for an immediate ceasefire in place.

00:15:53

It called for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in November 1967 and which stated certain general principles on the basis of which peace should be achieved in the middle.

00:16:08

East.

00:16:10

And thirdly.

00:16:11

It called for negotiations between the parties concerned.

00:16:15

Under appropriate auspices to bring about a just and durable peace.

00:16:23

In the Middle East.

00:16:27

This Third Point was the first international commitment.

00:16:32

To negotiations between the parties in the Middle East conflict.

00:16:39

The United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to offer their auspices.

00:16:45

If this proved to be acceptable to the parties.

00:16:48

To bring about an end to speed.

00:16:52

The process.

00:16:53

Of negotiation.

00:16:57

The United States continues to be ready.

00:17:01

To.

00:17:02

Carry out.

00:17:04

This understand?

00:17:08

This then was the situation.

00:17:11

When I returned from Moscow and Tel Aviv.

00:17:15

On Monday evening.

00:17:20

And since then, events have taken.

00:17:29

The following term.

00:17:33

On the first day that is Tuesday of the implementation.

00:17:38

Of the ceasefire.

00:17:42

Pull up there was.

00:17:45

A breakdown of the ceasefire.

00:17:49

Which led to.

00:17:52

Certain Israeli territorial gates.

00:17:57

The United States supported air resolute.

00:18:02

Which called on the participants to observe the ceasefire, to return to the places from which the fighting started.

00:18:09

And to.

00:18:12

Invite United Nations observers.

00:18:16

To to observe.

00:18:20

The implementation of the ceasefire.

00:18:26

In the last.

00:18:29

This seemed to us a fair resolution.

00:18:35

In the last two days, the discussions in the Security Council.

00:18:41

And the communications that have been associated with it.

00:18:45

Have taken a turn that seemed to us.

00:18:51

What is it? We were increasingly confronted with a cascade of charges which were difficult to verify in the absence of United Nations observers.

00:19:08

And the demand for actions that it was not within our power to take.

00:19:14

There was a proposal, for example, that joined US and Soviet military forces he introduced into the Middle East.

00:19:28

To bring about an observance of the ceasefire.

00:19:33

I would like to state on behalf.

00:19:35

Of the president.

00:19:37

The United States position on this matter.

00:19:40

Very clearly.

00:19:43

The United States does not favor.

00:19:46

And will not approve.

00:19:49

The sending of a joint Soviet United States force into the Middle East.

00:19:58

The United States believes.

00:20:01

That what is needed in the Middle East above all.

00:20:06

Is a determination of the.

00:20:07

Facts.

00:20:09

A determination of where the lines are.

00:20:13

And a determination of who is doing the shooting so that then the Security Council.

00:20:19

Can take appropriate action.

00:20:23

It is inconceivable.

00:20:25

That the forces of the great powers.

00:20:28

Should be introduced in the numbers that would be necessary to overpower both of the participant.

00:20:35

It is inconceivable.

00:20:38

That we should transplant.

00:20:40

The great power rivalry into the Middle East.

00:20:46

Or.

00:20:48

Alternative that we should impose a military condominium.

00:20:53

By the United States.

00:20:56

And the Soviet Union?

00:20:59

The United States is even more.

00:21:03

Of post.

00:21:04

To the unilateral introduction.

00:21:07

By any great.

00:21:09

Power.

00:21:10

Especially by any nuclear power of military forces into.

00:21:17

The Middle East, in whatever guise, those forces.

00:21:22

Should be introduced.

00:21:27

And it.

00:21:28

Is.

00:21:29

The ambiguity.

00:21:32

Of some of the actions and communications.

00:21:36

And certain readiness measures that were observed.

00:21:39

That caused the president.

00:21:41

At a special meeting of the National Security Council last night.

00:21:47

At 3:00 AM to order certain precautionary measures.

00:21:51

To be taken by the United States.

00:21:56

United States position with respect to peace in the Middle East is as follows.

00:22:03

The United States stands for a strict observance.

00:22:08

Of the ceasefire as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22nd.

00:22:19

The United States will support.

00:22:22

And give all assistance.

00:22:26

And is willing to supply some personnel.

00:22:31

To a United Nations observer force.

00:22:34

Whose responsibility it is.

00:22:37

To report to the Security Council.

00:22:40

About the violation of the ceasefire.

00:22:44

And which would have the responsibility?

00:22:47

In addition of aiding the parties.

00:22:52

In taking care of humanitarian and other concerns.

00:22:56

That are produced.

00:22:58

By the.

00:23:00

By the fact that on the Egyptian Israeli Front, a series of enclaves exist.

00:23:10

In which demarcation?

00:23:12

Is extremely difficult.

00:23:15

If the Security Council wishes.

00:23:19

The United States is prepared.

00:23:22

To.

00:23:23

Agree to an international force.

00:23:27

Provided it does not include any participants from the permanent members of the Security Council.

00:23:35

To be introduced into the area.

00:23:38

As an additional guarantee.

00:23:41

Of the cease-fire.

00:23:45

The United States is prepared to make a major effort.

00:23:51

To help speed.

00:23:53

A political solution?

00:23:56

Which is just to all sides.

00:23:59

The United States recognizes.

00:24:02

That the conditions.

00:24:04

That produce the war on October six.

00:24:10

Cannot be.

00:24:12

Permitted to continue.

00:24:16

And the United States.

00:24:18

Both bilaterally and unilaterally.

00:24:23

Is prepared to lend its diplomatic weight to a serious effort.

00:24:30

In the negotiating process foreseen by paragraph 3.

00:24:35

Of Security Council resolution 338.

00:24:40

We are therefore.

00:24:42

At a.

00:24:44

Rather crucial point.

00:24:48

From many points of view.

00:24:51

The chances for peace.

00:24:54

In the Middle East.

00:24:57

Quite promising.

00:25:03

Israel.

00:25:06

Has experienced once more.

00:25:09

The trauma of war.

00:25:12

And has been given an opportunity.

00:25:16

For the negotiations, it has soared for all of its existence.

00:25:22

And it must be ready.

00:25:25

For the just and durable peace.

00:25:28

That the Security Council resolution asked for.

00:25:31

Yes.

00:25:33

The Arab nations.

00:25:36

Have demonstrated.

00:25:38

Their concern and have received.

00:25:42

International assurances that other countries will take an interest in these negotiations.

00:25:53

The Soviet Union.

00:25:56

Is not threatened.

00:25:58

In any of its legitimate positions.

00:26:03

In the middle.

00:26:05

The principles I mentioned earlier.

00:26:10

Of the special responsibility of the great nuclear powers.

00:26:18

To strike a balance between their local interests and their global interests.

00:26:26

And their humane obligations.

00:26:31

Remains.

00:26:34

And seen in this perspective.

00:26:37

None of the issues.

00:26:40

That are involved.

00:26:42

In a in the observance of the ceasefire.

00:26:47

Would warrant.

00:26:49

Unilateral act.

00:26:52

As for the United States?

00:26:56

The President has stated repeatedly.

00:27:02

That this administration.

00:27:05

Has no higher code.

00:27:08

Than to leave to its successes.

00:27:10

A world that is safer.

00:27:15

And more secure than the one we found.

00:27:19

It is an obligation that any President, of whatever party.

00:27:25

Will have to discharge and it is a responsibility.

00:27:29

Which must be solved.

00:27:31

If mankind is to survive.

00:27:34

By.

00:27:36

The great nuclear countries at some point before it, is too late.

00:27:45

But we have always stated.

00:27:48

That it must be a peace with justice.

00:27:54

The terms.

00:27:56

That have been agreed to in the United Nations.

00:28:00

Provide an opportunity for the peoples of the Middle East to determine their own fate.

00:28:09

In consultation and negotiations.

00:28:12

For the first time in 25 years.

00:28:16

This is an opportunity we are prepared to foster.

00:28:21

It is an opportunity which is essential.

00:28:25

For this ravaged area, and which is equally essential for the peace of the world, and it is an opportunity.

00:28:34

That the great net powers have no right to permit to miss. Now, I'll be glad to answer the question.

00:28:41

Doctor Kissinger, could you go into a little more detail?

00:28:47

On the Soviet threat that could cause the US military elements last night, and also could you tell us if the Ambassador, John Brennan, delivered you a brutal notice described by Senator Jackson on the Middle East situation?

00:29:03

Senator Jackson is a good friend of mine, but he does not participate in our deliberations.

00:29:12

I will not discuss the details of individual communication.

00:29:19

We became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units and we were puzzled by the behaviour.

00:29:31

Of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place.

00:29:38

We do not consider ourselves in a confrontation.

00:29:42

With the Soviet Union.

00:29:44

We do not believe it is necessary at this moment.

00:29:48

To have a confrontation.

00:29:50

In fact, we are prepared to work cooperatively.

00:29:53

Towards the realization of the objectives which we have set ourselves.

00:29:59

But.

00:30:02

Cooperative action precludes unilateral action.

00:30:07

And the president decided that it was essential.

00:30:11

That we make clear.

00:30:14

Our attitude towards unilateral steps.

00:30:18

OK, when you were.

00:30:22

Early on, talking about the special responsibility of the two nuclear superpowers.

00:30:30

To avoid anything which could eliminate or incinerate humanity, he went on to say that there are limits beyond which we can't go.

00:30:41

And among those you said, we would resist any attempt to exploit the detente in a manner to weaken others or weaken our allies. I didn't get that exactly. But you will recall what you said and what I want to know. What?

00:30:58

And quoted my favorite author.

00:31:01

What I what I want wanted to ask you was whether you believe that the action of the right and so far, particularly in departing from what you thought was an agreement?

00:31:12

Has.

00:31:14

Gone to the point where it threatens exploitation of the detente to an adverse extent, we are not yet prepared to make this judgment.

00:31:29

We have to realize.

00:31:31

Of course.

00:31:32

As I pointed out in my.

00:31:34

Remarks.

00:31:35

That the Soviet Union and we.

00:31:38

Are in a very.

00:31:41

Unique relationship. We are one in the same time adversaries.

00:31:49

And partners in the preservation of peace.

00:31:54

As adversaries, we often find ourselves drawn.

00:31:59

Into potential confrontations.

00:32:03

And each of us has friends.

00:32:06

That in themselves that themselves pursue objectives.

00:32:12

That may not be sought fully by either of us.

00:32:19

When we took the precautionary steps of which you are all aware.

00:32:24

We did so because we thought there might be a possibility.

00:32:30

That matters might go beyond the limits which I have described.

00:32:35

But we are not yet prepared to say that they have gone beyond these limits and we believe that the possibility.

00:32:44

Of moving in the.

00:32:47

That the Security Council had established earlier this week.

00:32:52

It's still very real.

00:32:54

And if the Security Council today?

00:32:57

Where to pass a resolution?

00:33:00

That permitted the introduction of United Nations forces, except those of the permanent members.

00:33:09

The United States would feel that we are back on the road that had been charged earlier this.

00:33:15

Week could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians?

00:33:29

Are preparing for such an action.

00:33:32

And the reason?

00:33:33

I raised these questions, as you know, there has.

00:33:36

Some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much, perhaps by American domestic requirements, as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. And I wonder if you could provide some additional information.

00:33:53

Now then.

00:33:57

We are attempting to conduct.

00:34:01

The foreign policy of the United States.

00:34:05

With.

00:34:07

Regard.

00:34:09

For.

00:34:10

What we owe, not just.

00:34:14

To the electorate, but to future generations.

00:34:18

And it is.

00:34:21

A symptom.

00:34:23

Of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested.

00:34:28

That the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons.

00:34:34

We do not think it is wise at this moment.

00:34:38

To go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision.

00:34:44

Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic efforts, one way or.

00:34:49

The other.

00:34:51

We will make the record available.

00:34:54

And we will be able to go into greater detail.

00:34:58

And I am absolutely confident.

00:35:01

That it will be seen that the President had no other choice as a responsible national leader.

00:35:10

With you.

00:35:12

Would you say, Sir, why the United States feels that the permanent members of the Security Council should not send forces, although there is a chapter in the UN Charter, I believe that calls upon all members of the UN to provide forces if called upon to do so.

00:35:33

We believe that the particular provision of the Charter.

00:35:38

Which you mentioned should be seen in the light of the particular circumstance.

00:35:43

When you have a situation in which several of the permanent members.

00:35:49

May have conflicting interests, and when the presence of the forces of the permanent members may themselves contribute to the tension in the area.

00:35:59

It seems to us.

00:36:01

The only possible course?

00:36:05

To exclude the members, the forces of all permanent members.

00:36:14

It would be a disaster.

00:36:17

If the Middle East, already so torn by local rivalries.

00:36:23

Would now become as a result of a UN decision, a legitimised theater for the competition of the military forces of the great nuclear powers, and therefore it seemed to us.

00:36:41

That the political purposes would be best served.

00:36:45

If any international force that were introduced.

00:36:49

Were composed of countries that have no possibility.

00:36:55

Of themselves being drawn into rivalry as a result of big and.

00:37:00

Library.

00:37:02

First, burning may seem obvious. The purpose of the now going on to tell the Soviets.

00:37:03

And so we have heard Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explaining the reason why US armed forces have been placed on a general worldwide military.

00:37:11

Alert.

00:37:12

Mr. Kissinger, speaking from the State Department, warned the Soviet Union that the United States will not stand by and allow the Soviets to send troops into the Middle East. He said quote it is not warranted.

00:37:22

He said President Nixon ordered this military alert because the president decided the United States must make.

00:37:28

Feelings clear on this matter, Mr. Kissinger also had two proposals to make. First of all, he said, the United States will supply some personnel and will give all support and assistance to a UN observer force to go to the Middle East. And he said the United States will agree to an international peacekeeping force, provided no major powers. That is the United States.

00:37:48

For the Soviet Union, provide members to it, Douglas Kicker, NBC News, Washington.
Good afternoon.

00:37:56

This has been an NBC News Special Report and has come to you from Washington.

00:38:01

They were thrown.

00:38:01

Good afternoon.

00:38:03

To.

00:38:05

The confrontations.

00:38:07

Which sooner or later will have to be surmounted.

00:38:10

Because humanity cannot stand the eternal conflict of those who have the capacity to destroy it.

00:38:17

Cairo Radio service these with such an offer as Soviet troops or enforcing the seaside fire has been received from Moscow. Has such an offer been made, and if so, have the Soviet troops indeed been alerted? And are they on the move?

00:38:38

We are not.

00:38:40

Of course, aware of the diplomatic exchanges that may go on between the government of Egypt and the government of the Soviet Union, we are also not aware of any Soviet forces.

00:38:55

That may have been introduced into Egypt and we believe.

00:39:00

And we will bend every effort in that direction.

00:39:04

That any actions that are taken by any country in the Middle East.

00:39:10

Will be within the framework of the Security Council and of United Nations decisions. I want to repeat again.

00:39:17

We do not now consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

00:39:22

We continue to be prepared and we believe it is entirely possible.

00:39:28

To maintain the direction that has brought us to this point and on which the peace of the world depends.

00:39:36

Why?

00:39:37

We believe that the.

00:39:38

Soviet Union has a threatening election and this circumstance to the break of confrontation. You see, it's possible that they saw the events of last weekend having so weakened the president. He was threatened with impeachment that they saw a target of opportunity and.

00:39:52

Decided to move.

00:39:54

That speculation about motives.

00:39:59

All this day.

00:40:01

But.

00:40:03

One cannot have crisis of authority in a society for a period of months without paying a price. Somewhere along the line.

00:40:14

Give you.

00:40:15

From a public standpoint, until this morning that the public would have had the had the.

00:40:22

Belief and the view that this crisis was in hand, that the ceasefire was taking hold. So you have declined to discuss the diplomatic context of a specific communications, but was there prior to this latest sudden development?

00:40:41

Any indication that this situation might go into such a direction?

00:40:48

No, there was not until.

00:40:51

Yesterday afternoon, we had every reason to believe.

00:40:55

That the basic direction that had been established and to which all parties had agreed would in fact be implemented, and, I repeat.

00:41:05

We still believe.

00:41:07

That it is possible.

00:41:09

To continue in this direction.

00:41:12

Nobody has can gain.

00:41:15

From introducing great power rivalry or from compounding by compounding great power rivalry the overriding.

00:41:24

Goal in the Middle East.

00:41:27

Must be a just and durable piece.

00:41:30

Between the Arab nations.

00:41:33

And Israel?

00:41:34

That the United States is prepared and indeed determined to promote.

00:41:40

And that is the issue to which we should address ourselves.

00:41:47

Senator Jackson, among others, has said that this government has been operating under what he called an illusion of detente from the very beginning.

00:41:56

Can you be a little more precise now under these circumstances about the status of this detente with the Soviet Union?

00:42:04

Mr. Lysaga, we have from the beginning of this administration recognized.

00:42:12

That there is a that we are dealing.

00:42:16

With an ideological and political adversary.

00:42:21

We have also believed that we had a historic application.

00:42:26

Precisely in these conditions, of of being in our position to attempt to to remove the dangers of.

00:42:37

We have always made clear and we have always practiced.

00:42:42

That we would resist any foreign policy adventures.

00:42:49

Through the many crises in the early parts of this administration.

00:42:56

Where we have differed with some of our critics.

00:42:59

Was our convict.

00:43:02

That.

00:43:03

It was dangerous.

00:43:06

To attempt to interfere in addition.

00:43:09

In the domestic affairs of a country with such a different domestic structure and such a different ideological orientation.

00:43:23

We have.

00:43:25

Maintained.

00:43:27

The integrity of our allies and the security of the United States, while reducing the danger of war.

00:43:37

As I said in my remarks.

00:43:41

This is a historic task that somebody will have to solve and that it is in the interests of all Americans and of all of mankind that it be solved as quickly as possible.

00:43:55

As for the status of the detente.

00:43:58

I think we can make a better judgment when we know whether peace has taken hold. If the Soviet Union and we can work cooperative.

00:44:09

First towards establishing the ceasefire.

00:44:12

And then towards promoting a durable settlement in the middle.

00:44:16

East.

00:44:17

Then the deterrent will have proved itself. If this does not happen.

00:44:23

Then we have made an effort.

00:44:26

For which we have paid no price.

00:44:30

That had to be made.

00:44:32

And then one has to wait for another moment.

00:44:36

When the task of it of ensuring.

00:44:40

Or of bringing peace to mankind can be attended.

00:44:44

The reports of this President.

00:44:46

Joined the Soviet plan for a joint Soviet US force were rather widespread before you went to Moscow, especially in Eastern Europe. Did Mr. Brezhnev discussed this idea with you in any way, and if not, why do you think he kept quiet?

00:45:00

But it then only to appear to activate it a.

00:45:03

Few days later.

00:45:03

But I don't know what plans were widespread in Eastern Europe. I can only deal with plans which reach us in some official manner.

00:45:15

The plan for a joint US Soviet military force in the Middle East was never approached to us, either publicly or privately, until yesterday.

00:45:27

And we immediately.

00:45:29

Made clear.

00:45:31

That we would not participate in such a force, and also that we would oppose any unilateral moves.

00:45:38

You've said that US Soviet auspices might be.

00:45:43

Useful in moving this along diplomatically. Are you prepared personally to play a role in getting these talks started? And secondly, have all the parties except the necessity for direct Arab Israeli talks?

00:46:02

We have not been in equally close contact with all of the parties.

00:46:09

And we have reason to believe that a sufficient number of the parties have accepted these talks.

00:46:16

For them to start, and indeed.

00:46:20

As late as yesterday afternoon.

00:46:22

Preliminary conversations took place between Ambassador Dobrynin and me about the site.

00:46:29

The participation and the procedures for these talks.

00:46:34

Earlier you referred to legitimate Soviet interests in the in Middle East.

00:46:41

Indicated that he felt they were not as a threatened there had the Soviets indicated they agreed with.

00:46:46

That with your assessment.

00:46:52

On the basis of the conversations.

00:46:56

That I had with General Secretary Brezhnev as late as last Sunday.

00:47:02

And the communications that were exchanged afterwards between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev, there was every reason to expect.

00:47:14

That while, of course our interests were not congruent.

00:47:18

And while of course there were differences in approach.

00:47:23

That.

00:47:25

A certain.

00:47:27

Parallelism could develop.

00:47:29

In the direction of producing a permanent peace.

00:47:36

And therefore I would have to say that we had reason to believe and we have no reason yet to alter our estimate.

00:47:45

That the that a.

00:47:48

That the joint auspices of which the Security Council resolution speaks can yet be implemented.

00:47:55

Doctor Kissinger, Dr.

00:47:58

Laid it good.

00:47:59

And then you.

00:48:01

Between the two.

00:48:02

Ceasefire residents United Nation in that period, the Israeli forces have made substantial.

00:48:04

Please.

00:48:08

Agents on the ground.

00:48:09

Because the United States prepared to urge Israel to comply with the resolution which called for all parties to withdraw.

00:48:17

Time of the first used car.

00:48:18

United States supported both resolutions and is today supporting another resolution containing similar provisions as well as a provision for an international force drawn from all Member States of the United Nations for which all Member States of the United Nations.

00:48:38

Would be eligible, except the permanent members of the Security Council. Doctor Kissinger, I noticed that you said the president decided on the military alert and you said the President has no other choice.

00:48:50

Did you recommend?

00:48:51

This, or did the President initiate the military alert matter, and do you feel it's a totally rational decision?

00:49:01

Mr. Malinov, I have a.

00:49:05

General rule not to provide a checklist of what advice I give to the President, but due to the particular implications of of your remark, I may say that all of the President, senior advisors.

00:49:21

All the members of the national security.

00:49:24

Were unanimous in their recommendation as a result of a deliberation in which the President did not himself participate and which he joined only after they had formed their judgment that the measures taken, that he in fact ordered were in the essential national interest.

00:49:43

Doctor.

00:49:45

Would you say what in your?

00:49:46

Judgment change from the period yesterday when you and Ambassador to Green were talking about participation and sites and so on. And the period last night it led the Soviets to take the action that they took. What in your estimation?

00:50:06

The.

00:50:07

I would like to make clear that as of now, the Soviet Union has not yet taken any irrevocable action.

00:50:15

It is our hope.

00:50:19

That such an action will not be taken.

00:50:23

I repeat again what I have said on many occasions in this press conference, we are not seeking an opportunity to confront the Soviet Union.

00:50:35

We are not asking the Soviet Union to pull back from anything that it has done.

00:50:41

The opportunity for pursuing the joint course in the Security Council and in the diplomacy afterwards is open.

00:50:50

The measures we took and which the President ordered were precautionary in new.

00:50:57

They were not directed at any actions that had already been taken and therefore there is no reason for any country to back off anything that it has not yet done.

00:51:09

As to the motives, I think we should assess that after the current situation is.

00:51:15

Over.

00:51:17

In fact, you're getting here really fast.

00:51:22

Well, let me get this question and then.

00:51:24

You.

00:51:25

Sir. And the reasons that prompted the President to make his decision, did any of those reasons include a threat aimed against this country as opposed to a threat in the?

00:51:35

At least I really do not think it is appropriate for me to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges. We are not talking of threats that have been made against one another. We are not talking of a.

00:51:55

Missile crisis type situation we are talking of a situation where 72 hours ago we still introduced joint resolution where the necessity for a joint.

00:52:09

Movement towards peace is as real now as it was then.

00:52:14

Where the participants in the Middle East have everything to gain from a period of quiet and from A and from at least watching or attempting to see what an American diplomatic effort can produce, and therefore we are talking about a precautionary.

00:52:35

Situation and not an actual 1 yes.

00:52:39

I I'm it seems to me that you're asking the American people, you president.

00:52:46

Who are already badly shaken by the events of the last week.

00:52:52

To accept it very.

00:52:54

Maddie, military alert involving nuclear forces on the basis of a kind of handful of smoke without telling them or us.

00:53:06

Exactly why? If I understood you earlier, you said that.

00:53:12

We had discovered.

00:53:14

The alert of some Soviet fortress.

00:53:18

And we were disturbed by the behavior, apparently of some people that American officials were dealing with and that that's all we really have to justify this alert. Now, this country is pretty badly shaken.

00:53:35

And I wonder if you can give us anymore information that will help convince people that there's some solid basis for the actions that have been taken.

00:53:46

They are attempting to preserve the peace in very difficult circumstances.

00:53:52

It is up to you, ladies and gentlemen, to determine whether this is the moment.

00:53:58

To try to create a crisis of confidence in the field of foreign policy as well.

00:54:06

We have tried to.

00:54:07

With.

00:54:08

As much information as we decently and safely and properly can under these conditions.

00:54:15

As soon as there is a clear outcome, we will give you the full information and after that you will be able to judge whether the decisions were taken hastily.

00:54:29

Or improperly.

00:54:32

The alert that has been ordered is a of a precautionary nature and is not of any major and irrevocable is. It is not in any sense irrevocable.

00:54:48

It is what seemed to be indicated by this situation.

00:54:54

We will be prepared, however, and I'm certain within a week to to put the facts before you, but there has to be a minimum of confident.

00:55:06

That the senior officials of the American government are not playing with the lives of the American people.

00:55:13

Kissinger, the immediate problem in the Middle East at the moment appears to be the concern by the Egyptians for the safety of its 3rd Army on the East Bank of the canal. Are there any steps being taken to possibly ameliorate their situation? And secondly, could you give us some more details about the front of your converse?

00:55:33

Patient has two forthcoming talks about 12 hours ago, everybody was waiting for talks to begin. Can you tell us in which directions and anticipate that will go?

00:55:44

We believe.

00:55:46

That the particular problems that are raised by a ceasefire in which the forces are deployed in such a curious fashion in one unit.

00:56:00

Each, each army having units behind the lines of the other that these conditions, first of all produce, especially the initial phases, many difficulties.

00:56:14

We are also absolutely convinced.

00:56:17

That, with the presence of observers.

00:56:21

With goodwill.

00:56:23

On.

00:56:24

All sides and with the active participation of the.

00:56:30

United States and the Soviet Union.

00:56:32

That the difficulties.

00:56:35

Can be substantially eased and eventually removed.

00:56:41

It is my understanding, for example, that some humanitarian supplies reached the 3rd Army today.

00:56:48

And we would certainly be prepared.

00:56:50

To lend our good officers.

00:56:53

To an effort.

00:56:55

In which the in which neither side.

00:56:59

Gained a decisive advantage.

00:57:01

As a result of the deployment of their forces.

00:57:06

I therefore am convinced that the particular conditions of the ceasefire, difficult as they are.

00:57:16

Can be dealt with.

00:57:19

And can be ameliorated with statesmanship on all sides. You have, Shirley told Dobrynin than the others, what you have told us, and perhaps even more, can you give us any indication of what effect this had on these two?

00:57:24

I.

00:57:24

Think.

00:57:40

We are at this moment in the Security Council.

00:57:45

Debating the resolution that we are supported.

00:57:51

If that resolution is accepted and carried out.

00:57:55

We believe that it will lead to an immediate easing of the situation and to a restoration of the conditions as we observe them at noon yesterday, may I say also that this press conference was scheduled at a time.

00:58:10

Before this latest event was known, was.

00:58:16

Affected and I went through with it in order to be able to put into perspective the evolution that brought us here and as much of the reasoning as I could given the delicacy of the situation. But.

00:58:30

Because it's about.

00:58:31

What was the second?

00:58:32

Our negotiations, we believe that negotiations.

00:58:36

Can and should begin in a matter of a very few weeks.

00:58:41

How? How?

00:58:42

Yeah.

00:58:43

What you said you were discussing participation forum. I wondered if you could give us more details.

00:58:47

I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce that.

00:58:51

Tell me again.

00:58:53

The Soviet Union will vote on the resolution today.

00:58:57

Think the debate is still? It's still in process and once we know the result of that vote.

00:59:05

No.

00:59:06

Limitation of how?

00:59:07

Right. Well.

00:59:08

We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

00:59:13

If the.

00:59:14

Is passed. Doctor Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

00:59:18

The alert will not last one minute longer.

00:59:21

Then then we believe it's necessary and it would be taking off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

00:59:32

Doctor Kissinger concerning the role that the United States may play in obtaining conditions for an enduring peace. Several months ago, you were reported as saying that you were supportive of an American policy that supports Israel but not Israeli conquest. It's not what is your view on that?

00:59:32

You know.

00:59:51

No.

00:59:54

I think I was quoted to that effect.

00:59:58

4 1/2 years ago.

01:00:01

Before I understood the.

01:00:04

Special nomenclature that is attached to the various ground routes.

01:00:11

Our position is that as I.

01:00:16

Have stated publicly.

01:00:19

That the conditions that produced.

01:00:22

This war.

01:00:23

Were clearly intolerable.

01:00:26

To the Arab nations.

01:00:29

And that in a process of negotiations, it is will be necessary for all sides.

01:00:37

To make substantial concessions.

01:00:40

The United States the problem will be to relate the Arab concern.

01:00:48

Over for the sovereignty of the territories, to the Israeli concern.

01:00:55

For secure boundaries.

01:00:59

We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this and, as the President has stated, to the four Arab Foreign Ministers and, as we have stated repeatedly, we will make a major effort.

01:01:19

To bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties, but I think no purpose would be served by my trying to delimit the exact.

01:01:30

Nature of all of these provisions.

01:01:33

Thank you very much.

01:01:39

Secretary of State Kissinger in a one hour news conference dominated by questions on the Middle East, Kissinger said today the United States does not favor and will not approve the sending of joint US Soviet force into the Middle East for peacekeeping purposes. Also he expressed opposition to the Soviet Union sending in troops.

01:01:57

Unilaterally for that.

01:01:59

First, he said, the president made the decision early this morning to put American troops on alert to demonstrate that opposition. He said the US is prepared to agree to an international peacekeeping force under UN auspices, provided that force would contain no personnel from permanent members of the UN Security Council meeting.

01:02:19

This country and Russia primarily.

01:02:21

He said also today that the alert that went out for American military units was in the Essential national interest was a precautionary move, not directed at any action that had been taken. There was no need for any country to back down, he said. He couldn't explain more about it now, but hope to within a week. This is Barry Sarah from CBS News.

01:02:43

This has been a CBS News Special report.

01:02:47

This is CBS.